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The Hidden Constitution: Aboriginal Rights In 
Canada 
 
Most countries have a national myth-an account that purports to 
relate the central events of a country's history in compressed form, 
that explains how the country has come to be and what it stands 
for. National myths are useful and perhaps indispensable ways of 
making the complex past relevant to the perplexing present. They 
provide the framework for much historical writing, and subtly 
influence lawyers and judges on constitutional issues. All national 
myths involve a certain amount of distortion. But some at least 
have the virtue of broad historical accuracy, roughly depicting the 
major forces at work. The myth that underlies much legal thinking 
about the history of Canada lacks that redeeming feature. 
It is commonly assumed that North America was juridically a 
vacant land when first encountered by Europeans. Bit by bit, lands 
were wrested from the wilderness and settled or exploited under 
grants from a European monarch, who had obtained complete 
sovereignty and title to the soil upon discovery. All land rights in 
Canada, other than prescriptive rights, stem directly or indirectly 
from Crown grants. Our laws, legal institutions, and constitutional 
arrangements all derive from Europe or were created by European 
settlers. Our law-making bodies ultimately owe their authority to 
the British Parliament or the British Crown. There are, in a word, no 
truly indigenous laws, rights, legislatures, or courts in Canada. 
This account has marked shortcomings. North America was not, 
of course, uninhabited when first explored and settled by 
Europeans. It was the domain of a variety of independent peoples, 
who possessed their own territories, laws, and governmental 
institutions.
1
 These groups often had significant military capabilities, 
sufficient to make them respected and feared by the settler 
communities and their parent states. Native Americans were jealous 
of their independence and quick to avenge intrusions on their lands 
and offenses against their persons. Unless the aboriginal peoples 
could be conquered, a hazardous enterprise at best, their cooperation 
and consent were necessary for sufficient lands to be obtained for 
white settlement and held in safety. But Indian nations
2
 were not 
viewed simply as obstacles to European penetration. During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in particular, they were valued 
as trading partners and also as military allies in struggles with rival 
Christian powers. 
European imperial efforts in America usually proceeded on at 
least two levels simultaneously. At one level, European states 
grappled among themselves for exclusive access to the advantages 
offered by the New World, be these precious minerals, skins and furs, 
fish, timber, or land for settlement. In the effort to improve their 
position relative to one another, the colonial powers at times advanced 
extraordinary claims, and sought to justify them by resort to 
extraordinary principles. At various points, Papal Bulls, early 
discoveries or explorations, symbolic acts, or feeble coastal 
settlements were invoked by European nations to support 
pretensions to vast territories they neither occupied nor controlled. 
These claims had little foundation in either fact or reason, and 
usually met with the scorn of competing European powers, even if 
the same powers on occasion indulged in similar diplomatic fantasies. 
As Elizabeth I of England tartly observed to the Spanish 
Ambassador: to sail to and fro, to build huts, to name a river or a 
promontory could not confer ownership, since prescription without 
possession was of no effect.3 All that mattered in the final analysis 
was what a state could gain and hold by force, or coerce its rivals 
to recognize in a treaty settlement.4 
 
At another level, European states had to deal with the various 
native peoples who were the real masters of North America. France 
and England might sign a treaty whereby the lands around Hudson 
Bay would be left to the British Crown, but this document was of 
little assistance when it came to influencing, much less controlling, 
the aboriginal inhabitants.
5
 The imperial powers were thus obliged to 
maintain extensive sets of diplomatic relations with native American 
peoples, to enter into alliances, sign treaties, and exchange gifts.
6
 
Incoming Europeans often did their best to secure some authority 
over the indigenous groups they dealt with. However, frequently 
they were in no position to do this, and it was some time before 
the situation changed. 
Interesting complications resulted from the coexistence and 
interaction of these two diplomatic spheres. The tendency of 
many commentators has been to wish the complexities away by 
focusing on one sphere (usually the inter-European) to the 
exclusion of the other. This blessedly uncomplicated view can no 
longer be sustained. Yet if the historical role of native peoples is 
now widely recognized, it has not yet been accommodated by the 
standard intellectual framework that influences legal thinking. What 
we lack is a proper understanding of when and how the native 
peoples of Canada were won to the allegiance of the Crown, and 
what effect this process had on their original land rights, customary 
laws, and systems of government. Did the Crown gain sovereignty 
over Canada with or without the consent of the aboriginal peoples, 
and on what terms was it achieved? Did native groups come to 
occupy the same status as other Canadian subjects, or did they hold 
some special relationship with the Crown? It is a remarkable fact 
that coherent answers to these questions cannot be found in 
standard treatises on Canadian constitutional law and history, or 
even in more specialized works. 
The Constitution Act, 1982 invites us to remedy this deficiency.7 
Sec. 35 provides: 
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and 
affirmed. 
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes 
the Indian, Inuit and Metis peoples of Canada. 
This section has a curious past. It was not found in the original 
draft of the Act, but was inserted, in a slightly different form, upon 
the unanimous recommendation of the Parliamentary Special Joint 
Committee on the Constitution after strong representations from native 
organizations. The government's decision to include the section was 
treated by all parties as an historic occasion and given wide publicity. 
So, when the section was later dropped from the draft as the result of 
the federal-provincial agreement of November 1981, there was a sharp 
reaction among both native and non-native Canadians. Intensive 
lobbying and public demonstrations led to the section's reinstatement 
with one change: the word "existing" was added to the phrase 
"aboriginal and treaty rights."8 In announcing the new version, the 
Minister of Justice assured the House of Commons that the 
amendment did not alter the substance of the provision.9 
Sec. 35 has undergone further discussion since the enactment of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. Sec. 37 of the Act required that a 
constitutional conference be called within one year to deal with 
matters concerning the aboriginal peoples of Canada, including the 
identification and definition of their rights, and stipulated that 
representatives of aboriginal Canadians be invited to participate. In 
March 1983, the First Ministers' Conference on Aboriginal 
Constitutional Matters met at Ottawa, attended by the Prime Minister 
of Canada, the provincial Premiers or their delegates, territorial 
representatives and representatives from four national native 
organizations. The Conference agreed, in an accord dated 16 March, 
to make certain changes in the existing provisions, and to meet 
again within one year.
10
 Resolutions to effect the proposed changes 
are now being considered by Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures, and it seems likely the amending process will be 
successful. So here I will discuss the constitutional provisions in their 
amended form. 
Under the 16 March agreement, two further subsections will be 
added to sec. 35.11 The first serves to remove doubts as to whether the 
phrase ''treaty rights" in sec. 35(1) covers rights gained under now-
existing and future land claims agreements, a number of which have 
recently been concluded with native peoples or are in the process of 
being negotiated.
12
 The second specifies that the aboriginal and treaty 
rights referred to in sec. 35(1) are guaranteed equally to male and 
female persons, thus ensuring sexual equality in access to these 
rights.
13 The recent agreement also proposes to add a new sec. 35.1, 
requiring that any future amendments to the major constitutional 
provisions regarding aboriginal peoples will first be discussed at a 
Conference of First Ministers to which aboriginal representatives will 
be invited. 
These sections make up Part Il of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
entitled "Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada." They fall 
outside the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, found in Part I 
of the Act. They are supplemented by a provision located within the 
Charter proper that serves to shield native rights from the possible 
adverse effects of other Charter provisions. Sec. 25 states: 
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and 
freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or 
derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or 
freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
including 
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized 
by the Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and 
(b) any rights or freedoms that may be acquired by the 
original peoples of Canada by way of land claims 
settlement. 
The 16 March agreement changes the wording in para. (b) of sec. 25 so 
as to indicate that both past and future land claims agreements are 
covered.14 The agreement also adds a new sec. 37.1 requiring that two 
further First Ministers' Conferences be convened before April 1987 to 
discuss aboriginal constitutional matters. 
The most important of these various provisions is that found 
in sec. 35(1), which states that the existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized 
and affirmed. I will focus exclusively on this provision here, 
leaving aside a range of issues relating to its companion 
sections.15 It will be helpful first to identify the two groups of 
rights referred to, namely 
"aboriginal" and "treaty" rights, before considering the precise scope 




Sec. 35(1) adopts and confirms the common law doctrine of 
aboriginal rights.16 This doctrine holds that the Crown's 
acquisition of North American territories was governed by a 
principle of continuity, whereby the property rights, customary 
laws, and governmental institutions of the native peoples were 
presumed to survive, so far as this result was compatible with the 
Crown's ultimate title, and subject to lawful dispositions to the 
contrary. Aboriginal groups presumptively assumed the status of 
domestic dependent nations united by special ties to the crown as 
ultimate sovereign. The U.S. Supreme Court articulated this 
doctrine in the early cases of Johnson v. M'lntosh (1823)17 and 
Worcester v. Georgia (1832).18 It has figured prominently in a 
number of Canadian decisions over the years, and was recently 
reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. A.G. of British 
Columbia (1973).19 
The Quebec case of Connolly v. Woolrich (1867)20 provides an 
interesting example of the doctrine's operation. There the courts 
upheld a marriage contracted under Cree customary law between a 
white man and an Indian woman in the Canadian North-West, even 
though the same man later married another woman in a Christian 
ceremony recognized by Quebec law. In attempting to discredit the 
first marriage, the second wife argued, among other things, that 
English common law had been introduced into the North-West 
before the marriage took place, thus invalidating Indian custom. In 
any case, she said, the marriage customs of pagan and uncivilized 
nations such as the Crees could not be recognized even between the 
natives themselves, much less between a Christian and a native. 
These arguments did not persuade the courts. The trial judge noted 
that the first English and French settlers in the North-West found 
the country in the possession of numerous and powerful Indian 
tribes. Even if the settlers brought with them the laws of their 
mother countries, yet, will it be contended that the territorial rights, 
political organization such as it was, or the laws and usages of the 
Indian tribes, were abrogated-that they ceased to exist when these 
two European nations began to trade with the aboriginal occupants? 
In my opinion, it is beyond controversy that they did not-that so 
far from being abolished, they were left in full force, and were not 
even modified in the slightest degree in regard to the civil rights of 
the natives.21 
The doctrine of aboriginal rights draws on two main sources, 
namely French22 and English23 state practice regarding Indian 
nations from early colonial times, and the Royal Proclamation of 
1763. The first subject cannot be pursued here. The second, however, 
deserves more than a passing mention, because it provides essential 
background for an understanding of sec. 35(1). 
 
The Royal Proclamation of 176324 
By 1763, Great Britain's long struggle with France for American 
empire was over. At the Peace of Paris, France ceded all its remaining 
territories in Canada to the British Crown, as well as its territories east 
of the Mississippi River. Britain also obtained Florida from the Spanish 
Crown, thus completing its claims to the eastern and northern sectors of 
America.25  Only one area was left to another 
European power, namely the lands west of the Mississippi that 
France had relinquished to Spain the previous year.26 
These treaties temporarily sorted out the claims of the three 
main European rivals among themselves. But the French Crown 
could not give Great Britain what it did not possess itself, namely 
authority over the native groups inhabiting the ceded territories. 
These nations were, in many cases, trading partners of the French 
and sometime military allies. If they were not prepared to accept 
direct French authority, neither were they willing to accept that 
France might deposit them in the pocket of the English King. 
As the Chippewa leader, Minivavana, told an English trader: 
Englishman, although you have conquered the French, you 
have not yet conquered us. We are not your slaves. These 
lakes, these woods and mountains, were left to u.s by our 
ancestors. They are our inheritance; and we will part with 
them to none.27 
A similar viewpoint was expressed by certain Wabash River 
Indians: 
you tell us, that when you Conquered the French, they gave 
you·this Country. That no difference may happen hereafter, 
we tell you now the French never conquered, neither did 
they purchase a foot of our Country, nor have [they a right] to 
give it to you, we gave them liberty to settle for which they  
always  rewarded  us  and treated  us  with  great Civility.28 
Britain was well aware in 1763 of the precarious nature of its 
relations with the old Indian allies of France, and the growing 
dissatisfaction of its own native allies and trading partners. Since 
midcentury, the British government had been increasingly occupied 
with Indian affairs, and the war with France had emphasized the 
importance of native friendship and support. For some time, a plan 
had been afoot to assure the Indians of the Crown's good intentions 
by removing a principal cause of Indian discontent-white intrusion 
on Indian lands. This plan culminated in the publication of a Royal 
Proclamation on 7 October 1763.29 The interest of the document is 
not purely historical, for its main terms have never been generally 
repealed in Canada.30 Although it must be read in the light of later 
developments, it still forms a principal basis for aboriginal land 
claims in many areas. 
The Proclamation is one of those legal instruments that does 
simple things in complicated ways. The central idea of its Indian 
provisions is very simple: to ensure that no Indian lands in America 
are taken by British subjects without native consent. This objective is 
secured by three main measures: colonial governments are 
forbidden to grant any unceded Indian lands, British subjects to 
settle on them, and private individuals to purchase them, with a 
system of public purchases adopted as the official mode of 
extinguishing Indian title. The British government was particularly 
concerned at the prospect of white settlement spreading 
indiscriminately into the American interior, and so the 
Proclamation temporarily seals off much of that area to settlers, 
designating it an exclusive Indian territory. But the document's 
main measures are not confined to the Indian Territory; they 
apply throughout British North America. 
The Indian provisions of the Proclamation begin with a preamble, 
where the King explains his basic aims: 
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our 
Interest and the Security of Our Colonies, that the several 
Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom We are connected, 
and who live under Our Protection, should not be molested 
or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our 
Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to, 
or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, 
as their Hunting Grounds; . . . 
While the King asserts ultimate sovereignty over the Indians, 
he also acknowledges their semi-autonomous status, describing 
them as Nations or Tribes ''with whom We are connected, and 
who live under Our Protection." He recognizes that the Indians 
are entitled to undisturbed possession of the lands reserved to 
them, and, in an important formula repeated later in the text, 
defines these reserves as any Indian lands that have not been 
ceded to or purchased by the Crown. The King claims these lands 
as part of his dominions, but at the same time recognizes the 
existence of an Indian interest requiring extinguishment by 
cession or purchase. In technical terms, the Indian interest 
constitutes a legal burden on the Crown's ultimate title until 
surrendered. 
In 1763, most of the American territories claimed by Britain 
were unceded lands held by native peoples. Under the 
Proclamation, such lands were automatically deemed Indian 
reserves. Their boundaries were determined negatively by past 
Indian cessions and positively by current Indian possessions. 
Much of the unorganized American interior was still, of course, 
unceded. But other unceded lands lay within the undisputed 
boundaries of existing colonies, including the northern colonies of 
Rupert's Land, Quebec, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, now 
forming part of Canada. 
It is sometimes argued that the Proclamation recognized 
aboriginal land rights only in the exclusive Indian Territory 
created in the American hinterland.31 On this supposition, Indian 
title was not recognized in areas specifically excluded from the 
Territory, such as the coastal belt east of the Appalachian 
Mountains, and the colonies of Quebec and Rupert's Land.32 But 
the text does not support this view. After describing the boundaries 
of the tenitory, the Proclamation orders the removal of all pers9ns 
who have settled either within the tenitory "or upon any other 
Lands, which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are 
still reserved to the said Indians as aforesaid" (emphasis added). 
This provision clearly assumes that unceded Indian lands located 
outside the Indian Tenitory are reserved for Indian use. The King 
also forbids colonial Governors to make grants of "any Lands 
whatever, which, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us as 
aforesaid, are reserved to the said Indians, or any of them." The ban 
applies to unceded Indian lands generally, wherever they happen to be 
located. Finally, the Proclamation provides that no private person 
shall make any purchases from the Indians "of any Lands reserved to 
the said Indians, within those Parts of Our Colonies where We have 
thought proper to allow Settlement," and specifies that if the 
Indians are ever inclined to dispose of such lands, they shall be 
purchased for the Crown in a public assembly. Since the provision 
only applies in areas where settlement was permitted, and the Indian 
Territory was, for the time being, expressly closed to "any Purchases 
or Settlements whatever," it could only refer to unceded Indian 
lands found outside the Territory, in eastern and northern colonies 
where settlement was still allowed. 
In brief, the Proclamation recognized that lands possessed by 
Indians throughout British territories in ·America were reserved for 
their exclusive use, unless previously ceded to the Crown. Prior to a 
public cession of such lands, they could not be granted away or 
settled. These provisions applied not only to the Indian Territory, 
but to the full range of British colonies in North America, no matter 
how humble or peripheral. In this respect, Rupert's Land, Quebec, 
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, the Thirteen Colonies, and the Floridas 
were brought under a uniform legal regime.33 The Indian Territory 
was placed in a special position. Whereas in other areas Indian 
lands might still be purchased by public authorities, in the territory 
such purchases were forbidden altogether for the time being. The 
idea was to divert the flow of white settlement from the American 
interior to the northern and southern colonies, which were still 
relatively sparsely settled. However, the Crown envisaged that in 
due course parts of the Territory might be opened up, in which 
case the standard regime governing purchase of Indian lands 
would take effect. 
There has been some controversy whether the Proclamation 
applied to the far western reaches of the American continent, 
notably modern British Columbia and the Yukon Territory.34 The 
question has usually been treated as depending on how much 
territory Great Britain claimed in 1763. Here, the historical 
evidence indicates that British claims extended indefinitely 
westward to the Pacific Ocean in latitudes now occupied by 
Canada.35 But a better basis exists for resolving the issue. Many of 
the Proclamation's provisions are framed in general terms, 
referring broadly to "Our Dominions and Territories" and "Our 
Colonies or Plantations in America." Imperial enactments using 
such terms were normally given a prospective application, so as to 
apply not only to colonies and territories held when the 
legislation was enacted but also to those acquired subsequently, 
unless this result was clearly excluded. The purpose of the 
Proclamation was to supply a uniform set of rules governing 
Indian lands throughout British territories in North America. 
There is o reason to think that Indian lands located in territories 
acquired after 1763 needed less protection than those acquired 
earlier. It is natural to infer that the Proclamation applied to both.36 
The Proclamation of 1763 has a profound significance for 
modern Canada. Under its terms, aboriginal peoples held 
continuing rights to their lands except where these rights have 
been extinguished by voluntary cession. Treaties of cession have 
been signed for large parts of Canada, notably in Ontario and the 
Prairie Provinces. But no such treaties exist for the Atlantic 
Provinces, and parts of Quebec, British Columbia, the Yukon, and 
the Northwest Territories, as well for pockets of land elsewhere. 
Moreover, there is doubt whether Canadian legislatures were 
competent to override the Proclamation's terms prior to 1931, when 
the Statute of Westminster was enacted.37 So native peoples may 
today hold subsisting aboriginal rights to large tracts of Canadian 
land. 
 
The Adaptability of Aboriginal Rights 
As noted earlier, the doctrine of aboriginal rights extends not 
only to property rights but also to customary laws and governmental 
institutions. It is important to understand that the internal 
development of such rights was not arrested at the time the Crown 
acquired sovereignty. Rather, these rights retained a certain amount of 
inherent flexibility, allowing for adaption to new circumstances. So, 
for example, the customs of a native group were not permanently 
frozen at the time the Crown first asserted sovereignty, in 1670, or 
1763, or at some other date. They remained responsive to changes in 
group behavior and attitudes. Likewise, the right of self-government 
was not tied down to institutions and arrangements prevailing at 
some distant historical period. In principle, a native group remained 
free to adopt new governmental structures. 
The position of aboriginal land rights is more complex. As we 
have seen, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 laid down a uniform legal 
regime governing native title, whereby native groups were recognized as 
holding communal rights to their unceded lands, subject only to a 
restriction of alienation. The same position has been held to obtain in 
common law. At the communal level, the title was a uniform one, not 
varying in character from group to group or affected by local native 
custom. It was the same for a nation of farmers as for a band of 
hunters. In all cases, it allowed for full possession and use of the land. 
But within a group, the extent to which a particular sub-group, family, 
or individual might take advantage of the group's collective title was 
determined by rules particular to the group itself, as dictated by 
customary law and group organs of self-government. In a nutshell, the 
rights of the group as against the Crown and other outsiders were 
governed by uniform rules flowing from the Proclamation and the 
common law, while the rights of group members inter se were 
governed by rules peculiar to the individual group. The latter could be 
altered in the same manner as other group customs, by a general 
change in attitude and practice, or deliberate amendment by competent 
bodies. 
Aboriginal title imported full rights of possession and use. 
Native groups were not confined in law to any particular mode of 
land use, much less to ''traditional" uses. An Indian band that 
originally lived by hunting or fishing might turn to farming when 
wild game became depleted, or to ranching, lumbering or mining. To 
hold that native peoples were permanently wedded to certain 
historical practices would in some cases have been to sentence them 
to slow starvation; in any case, it would have denied them the right 
to adapt to new conditions or exploit their lands more productively. 
The Proclamation did not establish any boundaries between 
native groups. In practice, such boundaries tended to fluctuate in 
response to demographic, economic, or military pressures. It could 
hardly be held that an Indian band that migrated in search of better 
hunting conditions or security from its enemies forfeited any claim to 
aboriginal title. So, it was recognized that native peoples were 
entitled to the unceded lands they actually possessed at any given 
period. When the Crown wanted to negotiate the sU1Tender of 
certain lands, it dealt with the people actually controlling them. There 
was usually no inquiry whether the people had been there from 
"time immemorial" or the date the Crown first claimed sovereignty. 
Such an approach would have quickly proved unworkable. Of course, 
once native lands had been validly ceded by a group holding title to 
them, they were permanently withdrawn from the pool of lands 
available for aboriginal possession. 
 
Indian Treaties 
As we have seen, many of the native peoples inhabiting the 
territories claimed by Great Britain in 1763 were in fact independent; 
at best they were allies and trading partners of the Crown, at worst 
declared enemies. In areas remote from the eastern colonies, there 
were numerous groups that had little if anything to do with the British 
at all. 
The Crown thus faced the task of consolidating its territorial 
claims by slowly earning the allegiance of the native inhabitants. 
From time to time, it also needed to obtain Indian lands for 
settlement, and here the Royal Proclamation required a voluntary 
public cession. The practice of making treaties with the Indians was 
well adapted to both purposes. It was followed in many British 
colonies up to Canadian Confederation in 1867, and continued by the 
Federal government for many years after that date.38 Indeed, treaties 




Indian treaties have taken many forms over the years. Some 
treaties, usually concluded during the early stages of European 
contact, were drafted as international pacts, whereby a European 
state negotiated on equal terms with an Indian group regarding such 
matters as peace, friendship, trade, and alliance.40 Other 
agreements, which became more common as European states 
gained the upper hand, defined the relationship between the 
Crown and what was described as a dependent, protected, or 
tributary aboriginal nation, one that in some respects owed 
allegiance to the Crown, but in other respects remained 
autonomous.41 Another variety of agreement was more on the 
style of a voluntary submission, in which the members of an 
Indian group acknowledged their subordination to the Crown and 
undertook to behave as good and faithful subjects, in return for the 
Crown's protection and other advantages.42 These types of 
agreements all had international or broadly constitutional aspects. 
Others were more mundane. The most common was a simple 
cession of Indian land to the Crown in return for stated 
consideration, with no attempt to define the overall position of the 
Indian signatories vis-a-vis the Crown.43 
Many historical agreements were a mixture of types. An 
example is provided by Treaty Number Three, known as the 
North-West Angle Treaty, signed in 1873 between the Crown and 
the Saulteaux Tribe of Ojibway Indians, inhabiting an area now 
straddling the border of Ontario and Manitoba.44 The Treaty 
served a number of goals, broadly described in the opening 
paragraphs as obtaining the Indians' consent to the settlement of 
their country, and establishing peace and goodwill between them 
and the Crown. The initial clauses refer to the Indians as 
subjects of the Queen. But subsequent provisions make it clear 
that one function of the Treaty is in fact to secure the Indians' 
formal adherence to the Queen as sovereign. Thus, the Indians 
promise to conduct themselves as good and loyal subjects of Her 
Majesty, to obey the law, to maintain peace with both whites and 
Indians, to refrain from molesting the persons or property of other 
inhabitants, and to help apprehend any Indians infringing the law or the 
Treaty provisions. 
These were not mere pro forma undertakings. The independent 
attitude of the Indians is illustrated by the statement of their spokeman, 
Mawedopenais, during negotiations with Crown officials: 
We think it a great thing to meet you here. What we have heard 
yesterday, and as you represented yourself, you said the Queen 
sent you here, the way we understood you as a representative 
of the Queen. All this is our property where you have come. . . 
. This is what we think, that the Great Spirit has planted us on 
this ground where we are, as you were where you came from. 
We think where we are is our property. I will tell you what he 
said to us when he planted us here; the rules that we should 
follow us Indians He has given us rules that we should follow 
to govern us rightly.45 
This statement suggests that, from the Indians' perspective, they 
negotiated the Treaty as autonomous peoples, with their own 
countries and laws. The undertakings made in the Treaty to 
adhere to the Queen and her laws represent an important 
voluntary alteration in their status, if in reality those terms were 
fully explained to the Indian parties and accepted by them. 
The Indians also cede to the Crown "all their rights, titles and 
privileges" to a defined tract of land. In return, the Crown 
undertakes to set aside certain lands as Indian reserves, to make 
annual payments to the Indians, to maintain schools on the 
reserves, to furnish annual supplies of ammunition and twine, and 
to bestow other specified benefits. In a clause of great practical 
significance to the Indians, the Crown also agrees that they shall 
continue to have the right to hunt and fish throughout the lands 
surrendered, subject to any regulations made by the Government 
of Canada, and excepting any lands to be taken up for settlement, 
mining, lumbering, or other purposes. 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE 
 
We are now better equipped to interpret sec. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. The section states that "the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and affirmed." A number of difficult questions 
arise regarding the scope and effect of the provision. These 
depend in part on the meaning of the word "existing." It can be 
argued that the word has three distinct effects. First, it restricts 
sec. 35(1) to rights in existence when the Constitution Act, 1982 
came into force, and so excludes rights arising after that date. 
Second, it ensures that the section only covers rights that already 
existed under common law, statute, or other legal instrument. Third, 
it preserves the existing subordination of aboriginal and treaty rights 
to statute, and prevents the Constitution Act, 1982 from entrenching 
them. I will consider these arguments separately. 
 
The Time of Recognition 
Does sec. 35(1) apply to any aboriginal or treaty rights that happen 
to exist from time to time, or is it confined to those existing on the 
date the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force, on what I shall call 
the "commencement date"? In other words, does the section establish 
''floating" categories that attach to any rights meeting the section's 
description regardless of when they arise, or does it establish "fixed" 
categories covering a finite body of rights identifiable on the 
commencement date? On the first view, rights under a treaty signed 
in 1990 would benefit, while on the second view they would not. 
A standard rule of statutory interpretation provides that the law is 
always speaking and applies to new facts as they arise.46 But this 
presumption can be overturned by the statute's wording, and arguably 
the word "existing" has that effect here. Turning to judicial decisions, 
we find that "existing" has sometimes been held to have a 
prospective application, but in other cases to mean "existing at the 
time of enactment," depending on the context.47 The question comes 
down to what sec. 35(1) intends to say. 
Several factors can be cited in favor of the view that the section 
refers only to rights identifiable on the commencement date. There is 
a notable difference in phraseology between sec. 35(1) and the 
protective provision found in sec. 25 of the Charter.48  The latter 
refers to "any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that 
pertain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada," and does not use 
the qualifier "existing." The presence of that word in sec. 35(1) 
arguably intimates that a narrower range of rights is singled out 
for positive recognition, namely those identifiable on the 
commencement date. This conclusion is bolstered perhaps by the 
statement that the rights in question "are hereby recognized and 
affirmed." The wording suggests a discrete act of recognition, 
pinpointed in time, rather than a continuing process of recognition. 
The inference seems stronger, however, in the English version 
than in the French, where no equivalent for "hereby" appears.49 
Standing alone, then, sec. 35(1) might well be interpreted as 
covering only rights existing on the commencement date. However, this 
interpretation cannot easily be sustained in the light of sec. 35(3), 
which states: 
For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty rights" 
includes rights that now exist by way of land claims 
agreements or may be so acquired. 
This provision specifies that the word ''treaty" includes land 
claims agreements of the modern type. It also indicates that 
sec..35(1) covers rights arising from agreements signed after the 
commencement date. Rights that "may be . . . acquired" under 
land claims agreements are mentioned along with those that 
"now exist" a clear reference to rights acquired in future. 
Moreover, sec. 35(3) is presented, not as an exception to the 
rule laid down in sec. 35(1), but as a clarification of that rule, 
enacted only "for greater certainty." If the partial definition of 
''treaty rights" given in sec. 35(3) is inserted in sec. 35(1), it 
specifies in effect that the expression "existing . . . treaty rights" 
includes "existing rights that now exist by way of land claims 
agreements or may be so acquired ." This does not make sense 
unless the word "existing" means "existing from time to time." 
On balance, then, sec. 35(1) is best interpreted as embracing 
not only aboriginal and treaty rights that existed on the 
commencement date but also those arising later. So, rights 
acquired under treaties signed after that date will be covered. A 
different sort of effect may occur in the case of aboriginal rights. 
The particular form that such rights assume has in principle 
always been open to change under the doctrine of aboriginal 
rights. We saw, for example, that native customary law and 
governmental institutions were not petrified at the moment the 
Crown assumed sovereignty, but remained living entities open to 
development in accordance with group needs. Likewise, while 
aboriginal land title was uniform at the group level, it flowered into 
any number of distinct species within native groups, in accordance 
with customary law and rules laid down by communal organs. Such 
rules were not permanent, but could be altered from time to time. 
The enactment of sec. 35(1) did not bring to a sudden halt all 
evolutionary processes in these spheres; to the contrary, it 
reaffirmed the doctrine allowing for such evolution. 
If lights may be added by treaty to those already covered by 
sec. 35(1), it may be inferred that lights covered there may also be 
modified or extinguished by the same method, without 
constitutional amendment. As we will see later, the wording of sec. 
35(3) strongly implies that aboriginal land lights may be exchanged 
for treaty lights through land claims agreements. 
The general picture that emerges is this. Any aboriginal and 
treaty lights that stem from acts or circumstances occuring or 
existing prior to the commencement date qualify for coverage in sec. 
35(1). These lights may be supplemented by means of voluntary 
agreements (''treaties") signed with the Crown after that date. Rights 
flowing from such agreements will automatically be captured by sec. 
35(1), without need for constitutional amendment. By the same 
token, lights covered by the section may be diminished by 
agreement. The latter point will receive fuller treatment later. But for 
the moment it may be adopted as a working hypothesis. 
 
The Effect of Recognition 
A: second effect can arguably be attributed to the wording 
"existing." For a light to qualify under sec. 35(1), it must not only be 
an "aboriginal" or ''treaty" light within the section's meaning, it 
must also have a sound legal basis apart from the Constitution Act, 
1982 itself. 
The reasoning in support of this conclusion runs as follows. The 
section is confined to "existing" lights. But lights are intangibles; 
their existence cannot be demonstrated in the same way as teacups 
and toadstools. A light "exists" only to the extent that it can be 
justified by reference to some sort of normative :framework. The 
only framework which qualifies for this role is that provided by 
Canadian law. So, for a light to be an "existing light" within the 
meaning of sec. 35(1), it must already be recognized in Canadian 
law, apart from the Constitution Act, 1982. 
This requirement, if correct, has several consequences. Sec. 35(1) 
does not bolster the position of lights whose legal status is 
otherwise uncertain or defective. Moreover, it cannot heal any 
blemishes in the legal rights it covers; it takes them as they are, 
warts and all. In short, the section has no remedial effect in respect to 
the status or character of the rights it addresses. 
However, this interpretation is not wholly convincing. 
Consider the position of a right to an annuity held under an Indian 
treaty that was signed by the Crown under the royal prerogative but 
never confirmed by Parliament. Arguably, the right is 
unenforceable in Canadian law in the absence of Parliamentary 
approval.50 Assuming this is correct, does it necessarily follow that 
the right is not an "existing treaty right" within the meaning of sec. 
35(1)? It would seem more natural to read the section as referring 
to rights existing under the terms of the treaty, without reference 
to the larger question of their status in Canadian law. On this 
view, one effect of the section is in fact to remedy any 
imperfections in that status. 
So it can· be argued that the word "existing" does not require 
that the rights recognized by sec. 35(1) already have a firm basis 
in Canadian law. Rather, the phrase "existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights" can be interpreted as referring to any rights of that 
description that have not previously been extinguished by acts 
valid under Canadian law. Which interpretation is right? The 
issue turns less on a bald exegesis of the word "existing" than on a 
reasonable reading of the provision as a whole. We are drawn 
once again to the statement that the rights in question "are hereby 
recognized and affirmed." These words express the section's main 
purpose and effect, and supply the key to a balanced 
understanding of its terms. 
The phrase "are hereby recognized" can be read in two main 
ways: it can mean "are hereby acknowledged to be valid or 
genuine," or simply "are hereby accorded notice or 
consideration."51 If the second construction is correct, then the 
Constitution Act, 1982 does no more than "note" the rights in 
question, which raises the 
question why it bothers to deal with them at all. It seems more 
likely that the Act means to acknowledge officially the validity of these 
rights. In fact, the first meaning is the ordinary legal one. A widely 
used legal dictionary says that ''recognition" is equivalent to 
''ratification" and "confirmation."52 And a provision stating that courts 
"shall recognize and take notice of all equitable estates, titles, and rights" 
has been interpreted judicially as directing courts to give effect to 
those rights.
53 
A similar choice awaits us in interpreting the phrase "are 
hereby . . . affirmed." It can mean "are hereby confirmed or 
ratified," or alternatively "are hereby strongly asserted."54 Again, 
the first sense is the ordinary legal one, as dictionaries testify.55 
Black's, for example, says that "affirm" means to ''ratify, make firm, 
confirm, establish, reassert," and Jowitt's notes, among other things, 
that where a party to a voidable contract waives his right to avoid it he 
is said to "affirm" the contract.56 Given the doubts surrounding 
aboriginal and treaty rights, it seems likely that the Constitution Act, 
1982 uses "affirm" in its normal legal sense of "confirm" or ''ratify." 
This conclusion is supported by the French version of sec. 35(1), 
which has equal authority with the English. It provides that the 
rights in question are "reconnus et confirmes ." Thus, "confirmes" is 
presented as the equivalent of "affirmed." The choice of words is 
significant. Le Petit Robert tells us that "con.firmer", as used in the 
present context, means "to render certain; to affirm . . . the 
existence of something."57 Moreover, a standard French-English 
dictionary supplies only one English meaning for "con.firmer," namely 
"to confirm," and gives as an example the phrase "con.firmer un traite ," 
that is, ''to ratify a treaty."58 It follows that the phrase "are hereby. . . 
affirmed" in sec. 35(1) means "are hereby confirmed"; only then does 
it have a common core of meaning with the French text. 
There are numerous authorities on the juridical meaning of 
"confirm." They hold in effect that to confirm something is to 
complete or establish what was previously imperfect or uncertain, or 
to ratify what was done earlier without authority or insufficiently.59 
In particular, it seems that to confirm a document may mean to give 
it a life that it otherwise lacked, as when an invalid document is 
confirmed by another document.60 In land law, a "confirmation" is 
the conveyance of an estate or right in lands or tenements to 
someone who already has possession thereof or some estate therein, 
whereby avoidable estate is made sure and unavoidable or a 
particular estate is increased or enlarged.61 
These authorities suggest that sec. 35(1) has a broad remedial 
effect. It addresses itself in part to rights that arguably lacked legal 
status, or were uncertain or defective in various respects, and 
recognizes them as legal rights, and not merely moral or political 
rights, or precarious rights dependent on the will of the Sovereign. 
It follows that the word "existing" does not confine the section to 
rights already recognized at law, or prevent it from remedying 
defects in those rights. There would be little point in recognizing and 
affirming rights if the effect were restricted in advance to rights 
that needed no recognition or affirmation. Rather, the word 
"existing" should be read in the second sense considered above, as 
meaning "unextinguished" or "subsisting" -thus excluding rights 
that had been terminated by lawful acts prior to the 
commencement date, but not requiring that any unextinguished 
rights have been fully recognized in Canadian law before that date. 
One point needs explanation. To say that certain rights are 
now confirmed as legal rights, or that defects in their legal 
character are cured does not necessarily mean that such rights 
are immune to statutory override. It means that they are full-
fledged legal rights, enforceable in the courts, and secure against 
possible invasion by executive act under the prerogative. Whether 
the Constitution Act, 1982 also shields aboriginal and treaty rights 
from statutes is a distinct question, which I shall now consider. 
 
Entrenchment 
Aboriginal and treaty rights could in principle be modified by the 
acts of a competent legislature before the Constitution Act, 1982 took 
effect.62 Has this position now changed? The answer depends in part on 
sec. 52(1) of the Act. This states: 
The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and 
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force 
or effect. 
The term "Constitution of Canada" is defined in sec. 52(2) as 
including the Constitution Act, 1982. Is a law that infringes a right 
in sec. 35(1) void for inconsistency with the Constitution of 
Canada? It will be simpler, in answering this question, to deal 
first with statutes passed after the commencement date, and then 
those before that date. 
Suppose, in 1990, Parliament enacts a statute expropriating a 
tract of aboriginal land covered by sec. 35(1). The Constitution Act, 
1982 directs the courts to recognize the aboriginal title in question, 
while the statute tells them to disregard it. The courts cannot do 
both. In the absence of any special factors justifying the 
expropriation, as discussed later, the constitutional provision must 
take precedence and nullify the conflicting statute. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the word "existing" in sec. 
35(1) preserves aboriginal and treaty rights in the state they were in at 
the commencement date, which, in principle, included a 
subordination to statute. If a legislature was competent to curtail 
aboriginal and treaty rights before the Constitution Act, 1982 took 
effect, it is still competent to do so. But we have already seen that 
the phrase "are hereby recognized and affirmed" gives the section a 
broad remedial effect, disposing of the notion that it preserves the 
status quo. Moreover, the argument confuses the section's scope 
with its legal effect. The fact that the section only covers "existing" 
rights does not necessarily mean that the Act's effect on these 
rights is controlled by the law formerly in force.63 
Another factor must be considered. Sec. 35(1) can only be 
amended in accordance with Part V of the Act. Under the ordinary 
procedure, laid down in sec. 38, an amendment requires the approval 
of Parliament and of two-thirds of provincial legislatures accounting 
for fifty percent of the total population of the provinces. Yet the 
argument set out above holds, in effect, that sec. 35(1) could be 
eviscerated by an ordinary federal statute stating that ''the existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby extinguished." It seems very unlikely that the amending 
formula can be circumvented so easily. 
This conclusion is supported by the wording of sec. 35(4). It 
provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal 
and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed 
equally to male and female persons. 
The word "guaranteed" is significant, because it plainly indicates an 
intent to entrench. If sec. 35(1) did not guarantee aboriginal and 
treaty rights at all, what would be the point of stating that it 
guarantees them equally to both sexes? 
I conclude, then, that sec. 35(1) entrenches aboriginal and treaty 
rights against statutory override.64 But entrenchment does not 
completely preclude legal limitation of those rights. In determining 
whether a statute infringes a sec. 35(1) right, the courts will have 
to define the proper bounds of the right, and here they will be 
guided in part by standards of reasonableness. Once, however, 
those reasonable bounds have been determined it will not ordinarily 
be possible for statutes to overstep them. 
The question arises whether this is always true, or whether 
there may not be unusual circumstances in which a protected 
right, as properly defined, may be overridden by ordinary statute. 
Imagine that in wartime a particular tract of land is needed for 
defense installations, and for various good reasons no other tract 
will do. It happens the land is subject to aboriginal title. May the 
federal government expropriate the land by simple statute, or 
must it follow the cumbersome procedure laid down for 
constitutional amendments? It can be strongly argued that sec. 
35(1) is governed by an implicit standard of reasonableness, not 
only in its definition of the rights recognized, but also in the 
protection it affords to such rights. If this view is correct, then the 
government may probably proceed by statute, considering the 
urgency of its requirements. 
The implicit standard postulated here is clearly more 
demanding than that found in sec. 1of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
which provides that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
guarantees the rights set out in it "subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society." It seems that sec. 35 was placed outside 
the Charter precisely to put it beyond the reach of sec. 1. Moreover, 
certain aboriginal and treaty rights need special protection because 
they are capable of being exhausted. If all aboriginal lands were 
taken, aboriginal land rights would, of course, cease to exist. By 
contrast, a Charter right such as freedom of speech is capable of 
infinite renewal. 
These considerations suggest that sec. 35(1) erects a high 
barrier against statutory interference, one that can be surmounted 
only in emergencies, for pressing public need. So aboriginal and 
treaty rights are not, in ordinary circumstances, subject to statutory 
expropriation, even if generous monetary compensation is 
provided. What the Constitution Act, 1982 guarantees is the right itself, 
not its supposed monetary equivalent. Had the Act contemplated such a 
substitution, clear language would have been used. 
 
Prior Statutory Extinguishment 
We have been considering laws passed after the commencement 
date that violate a sec. 35(1) right. What about laws passed before 
that date? We saw earlier that the phrase "existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights" does not cover rights extinguished by legislation or 
other acts before the commencement date. In principle, then, no 
conflict can arise between rights "existing" on that date and acts 
passed before then, because the former are defined and limited by 
the latter. The real problem is determining whether an act passed 
before the commencement date actually extinguished the right in 
question. 
Treaty rights present particular difficulties. Where, for example, a 
statute in force on the commencement date was inconsistent with a 
right conferred by a treaty, and the enacting legislature was 
competent to modify the treaty, did the treaty right cease to "exist" 
for purposes of sec. 35(1)? Suppose a nineteenth century Indian 
treaty guarantees an unrestricted right of :fishing in a certain area, 
and a federal statute in force on the commencement date restricts 
:fishing in that area for all persons, including Indians. Clearly, the 
Indians do not have an unrestricted statutory right to fish. But does 
their treaty right still exist? 
The answer depends on the statute's wording. We must 
distinguish between a statute that nullifies a treaty right and one 
that merely fails to implement or observe it. The latter would not 
relieve the Crown of its obligations under the treaty. Where the 
statute's wording does not indicate that the treaty was present to the 
mind of Parliament and consciously repudiated, the treaty promise 
remains intact, if unfulfilled. Explicit words would seem necessary to 
release the Crown from promises made to private parties in return for 
substantial benefits gained at those parties' expense. So, where a 
statute in force on the commencement date is inconsistent with a 
treaty promise, but does not explicitly repudiate it, the Constitution 
Act, 1982 arguably affirms the promise and renders the legislation 
ineffective to that extent. 
The distinction is clear in principle, but not always in practice. 
Some Indian treaties expressly say that certain promises are subject to 
future governmental regulation. In Treaty Number Three of 1873, 
discussed earlier,65 the Queen agrees that the Indian parties shall 
have the right to continue hunting and fishing throughout the lands 
surrendered in the Treaty, "subject to such regulations as may from 
time to time by made by her Government of her Dominion of 
Canada," and saving any tracts taken up for settlement or other 
purposes. By contrast, certain earlier treaties containing similar 
promises make no reference to future governmental regulation.66 If 
sec. 35(1) entrenches the actual rights guaranteed in Indian treaties, 
what effect does it have on the promise made in Treaty Three? 
It could be argued, on the one hand, that the treaty right is 
explicitly characterized as subject to governmental regulation; so, the 
constitutional entrenchment of the right does not remove its liability to 
legislative erosion or extinguishment. On the other hand, it could be 
said that the treaty simply makes explicit what would in any case be 
understood: rights are subject to Parliamentary regulation unless 
specially" entrenched. On this view, since the Constitution Act, 1982 
alters the principle of Parliamentary supremacy referred to in the 
treaty, it also places the treaty right beyond legislative interference. 
The question boils down to the correct interpretation of the 
treaty. What does the Crown undertake to do, on a reasonable view of 
the written text and related negotiations? In 1873, hunting and 
fishing were the mainstay of many Indian groups. It seems unlikely 
that the Indians would have agreed that, in return for ceding away 
most of their lands, they would receive a right of hunting and fishing 
characterized as liable to complete suppression. On the other hand, 
the reference to governmental regulation is argt.1ably something 
more than the expression of a standard constitutional rule. At least in 
the written text, it seems to qualify the scope of the Crown's 
undertaking directly. 
These reflections suggest a middle road between the two opposing 
views. What the Crown promises is that the Indians shall have the 
right to hunt and fish, subject to future regulation as opposed to 
suppression. That is, the government reserves the power to regulate 
the manner in which the rights are exercised, short of substantial 
interference with the right itself. Of course, as a matter of 
constitutional law, the Crown in Parliament remained free to impose 
whatever statutes it wished, but, as a matter of treaty, the Crown 
undertook to confine its interference to mere regulation. If this 
interpretation is correct, the Constitution Act, 1982 reaffirms the treaty 
promise and nullifies any legislation that crosses the line between 
regulation and suppression. 
 
Voluntary Extinguishment 
A further question now arises. Can rights governed by sec. 35(1) 
be modified or extinguished by the voluntary act of the native people 
concerned without a constitutional amendment? To take a concrete 
example, can aboriginal land rights be ceded to the Crown by 
agreement coupled with ordinary legislation, or must an amendment 
to the Constitution Act, 1982 be secured? 
Forceful arguments can be made for the validity of voluntary 
surrenders, at least in the case of aboriginal land rights. The 
purpose of sec. 35(1), it can be said, is to insulate the rights of 
aboriginal peoples from external threat, not to protect native peoples, 
as it were, from themselves. There is no apparent reason why a total 
of seven pro"vinces should have to sanction a land claims settlement, 
as would be required under the amending formula in sec. 38. 
Neither would such a requirement better protect the interests of the 
native peoples themselves. It has always been considered possible 
for a native people to cede aboriginal lands to the Crown by treaty, 
and this historical practice is·reflected in the wording of sec. 35(1), 
with its reference to both aboriginal and treaty rights. 
More strikingly, both sec. 25 and sec. 35(3) refer to rights 
acquired under future land claims agreements.67 These references 
indicate that aboriginal land rights may be voluntarily exchanged for 
treaty rights, and are not inherently inalienable. They also imply 
that this exchange can take place without constitutional amendment. 
Thus, sec. 35(3) provides in effect that where an aboriginal land 
claim is settled, the agreement will be automatically entrenched in 
the Constitution. But if rights conferred in return for aboriginal 
lands are entrenched without constitutional amendment, it follows 
that the surrender itself may take effect without such amendment. 
It goes without saying that, for a surrender to be valid, it must be fully 




If we survey the results of our analysis, we are struck by the 
potential of sec. 35(1) to provide solutions to a number of 
longstanding problems and grievances. I have argued that the 
section officially confirms the doctrine of aboriginal rights, whereby 
the original rights of native American peoples are held to have 
survived the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty, except insofar as 
these were incompatible with the Crown's ultimate title, or were 
subsequently modified by statute or other lawful acts. It also confirms 
that aboriginal rights are legal rights, maintainable at law as against 
the Crown and private parties. The section likewise recognizes 
that rights conferred on native peoples in treaties signed by the 
Crown are enforceable in the courts, regardless whether the 
treaties were previously confirmed by statute. But the section 
does not resurrect any aboriginal or treaty rights that had been 
extinguished by lawful acts before the Constitutional Act, 1982 
came into force. Rights covered by the section are shielded 
against encroachment by ordinary statutes, except perhaps in 
cases of emergency. Nevertheless, they can be supplemented or 
diminished by voluntary agreement with the native peoples 
concerned, without resort to constitutional amendment. 
Beyond its practical effect, sec. 35(1) has an important symbolic 
significance. The Constitution now clearly acknowledges the 
historical role of native peoples in the making of Canada. That this 
should rank as an achievement is itself a poignant comment on the 
modern position of native peoples. It is now over two centuries 
since the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was issued. The 
bicentenary of that event passed twenty years ago without a trace 
of public recognition in Canada. The Constitution Act, 1982 is the 
measure of how far we have come in the past two decades. Canada 
now seem poised to reclaim as its own the constitutional structures 
that developed during almost five centuries of European relations 






Resolution to Amend the Constitution Act, 1982 
Whereas the Constitution Act, 1982 provides that an amendment to the Con- 
stitution of Canada may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor 
General under the Great Seal of Canada where so authorized by resolutions 
of the Senate and House of Commons and resolutions of the legislative as- 
semblies as provided for in section 38 thereof; 
 
And Whereas the Constitution of Canada, reflecting the country and 
Canadian society, continues to develop and strengthen the rights and free- 
doms that it guarantees; 
 
And Whereas, after a gradual transition of Canada from colonial status 
to the status of an independent and sovereign state, Canadians have, as of 
April 17, 1982, full authority to amend their Constitution in Canada; 
 
And Whereas historically and equitably it is fitting that the early exer- 
cise of that full authority should relate to the rights and freedoms of the 
first inhabitants of Canada, the aboriginal peoples; 
 
Now Therefore the (Senate) (House of Commons) (Legislative Assembly) 
resolves that His Excellency the Governor General be authorized to issue a 
proclamation under the Great Seal of Canada amending the Constitution of 
























PROCLAMATION AMENDING THE 
CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 
1. Paragraph 25(b) of the Constitution Act, 1982 is re- 
pealed and the following substituted therefor. 
"(b)   any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of 
land claims agreements or may be so acquired." 
2. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is amended 
by adding thereto the following subsections: 
"(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) ''treaty 
rights" includes rights that now exist by way of land 
claims agreements or may be so acquired. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection 
(1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons." 
 
3. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto, 

































































"35.1 The government of Canada and the provincial 
governments are committed to the principle that, before 
any amendment is made to Class 24 of section 91 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, to section 25 of this Act or to this 
Part, 
(a) a constitutional conference that includes in its 
agenda an item relating to the proposed amend- 
ment, composed of the Prime Minister of Ca- 
nada and the first ministers of the provinces, will 
be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada; 
and 
(b ) the Prime Minister of Canada will invite repre- 
sentatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada to 
participate in the discussions on that item." 
4. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto, 
immediately after section 37 thereof, the following Part: 
 
"PART IV.l 
CONSTITUTIONAL  CONFERENCES 
37.1 (1) In addition to the conference convened in 
March 1983, at least two constitutional conferences com- 
posed of the Prime Minister of Canada and the first 
ministers of the provinces shall be convened by the 
Prime Minister of Canada, the first within three years 
after April 17, 1982 and the second within five years after 
that date. 
(2) Each conference convened under subsection (1) 
shall have included in its agenda constitutional matters 
that directly affect the aboriginal peoples of Canada, 
and the Prime Minister of Canada shall invite repre- 
sentatives of those peoples to participate in the discus- 
sions on those matters. 
(3) The Prime Minister of Canada shall invite 
elected representatives of the governments of the 
Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories to par- 
ticipate in the discussions on any item on the agenda of 
a conference convened under subsection (1) that, in the 
opinion of the Prime Minister, directly affects the Yukon 
Territory and the Northwest Territories. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed so as 
to derogate from subsection 35(1)." 
5. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto, 
immediately after section 54 thereof, the following 
section: 














6. The said Act is further amended by adding thereto 
the following section: 
1161. A reference to the Constitution Act 1867 to 1982 
shall be deemed to include a reference to the Constitu- 
tion Amendment  Proclamation,  1983." 
7. This Proclamation may be cited as the Constitution 
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